(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Lõbus, Indrek; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Davies, Alexander Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
(Tartu Ülikool, 2014) Vaus, Sander; Cohnitz, Daniel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
In this essay I will defend Stephen Stich’s pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. The most
striking feature of his view is that it doesn’t place truth center-stage as a criterion of a good
cognitive system. In fact, he argues that having true beliefs is of little value, both intrinsically
and instrumentally, and what we should really want is to have beliefs that allow us to attain
the things that we actually value. This view is contested by Hilary Kornblith, who argues that
even if truth is not something we value intrinsically, then it is always of instrumental value for
attaining the things that we actually want to attain. For him, truth plays a pre-eminent role in
cognitive evaluation, and placing value on truth is thus pragmatically preferable.