(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Hallap, Mark; Sirkel, Riin, juhendaja; Lott, Toomas, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
In Plato’s Socratic dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro, all attempts at answering Socrates’
“What is the F?” question are rejected, but some answers are rejected in a peculiar way.
Socrates complains that Euthyphro’s first answer, and Meno’s first and third answers, provide
“too many” things for the F. This thesis considers several competing suggestions for why
Socrates rejects these answers. The following suggestions are argued to be unhelpful: (1) that
Socrates’ interlocutors provide particulars instead of universals, (2) that Socrates makes an
assumption that examples cannot be known before you know the definition, and (3) that the
interlocutors offer too narrow definitions. None of these explains why Socrates says that there
are too many things provided. Finally, the author argues that the answers are rejected because
Socrates assumes there is only one explanation for why F things are F.