Wilsonianismi mõjud USA välispoliitikas: juhtumiuuring 1999. aasta NATO operatsiooni Allied Force’i kohta
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In 1999 NATO attacked Yugoslavia for causing an ethnic conflict and a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The alliance did not use ground forces, but conducted the operation by air strikes. The given bachelor’s thesis shows on a certain case study how the US implements its Wilsonian foreign policy. The subject is still topical, as the Wilsonian approach is still followed in the US foreign policy and therefore one could predict how certain crises might be dealt with. The purpose of the thesis was to prove that the Operation Allied Force was not merely a humanitarian intervention, but also a Wilsonian mean to consolidate US influence in Europe. For this purpose I framed the concept of Wilsonian foreign policy during the 20th century, presented the facts about Kosovo policy and strategic approaches and finally allocated the Operation Allied Force in the frame of Wilsonian US foreign policy decision-making process. The expected results of the thesis were that the US participation in the Kosovo conflict settlement derived from the Wilsonian approach of the foreign policy. I concluded that the Operation Allied Force was not merely an intervention, which derived from humanitarian considerations, but also a Wilsonian mean to consolidate influence in Europe, because according to domino theory – peculiar to Clinton administration – the conflict in the peripheral Europe could spread into Europe’s core states, which could be dangerous to the USA. In addition, the involvement in the Balkan conflicts consolidated NATO’s strength and importance. NATO is the main US instrument to exercise hegemony over Europe and therefore it could not fail, otherwise it would show signs of weakness. For this purpose, the West – lead by the USA – used a form of coercive diplomacy during the negotiations at Rambouillet. The Rambouillet Accord itself was based on Wilsonian assumptions that when democracy is implemented, the conflict ends. The Operation Allied Force was conducted in a way that it could not fail. The range of targets was gradually increased and in the end the Clinton administration was on the verge of agreeing to a ground invasion, but Slobodan Milošević decided to capitulate before the decision could be taken. However, due to the protection of NATO forces the wider humanitarian catastrophe could not be prevented. In conclusion, the Kosovo conflict and the NATO intervention can be considered an episode of Wilsonian US foreign policy.