Keerukuse redutseerimine Eesti õiguses karistusseadustiku § 2172 objektiivse koosseisu relatiivsete õigusmõistete sisustamise näitel
Date
2015-01-13
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Abstract
Relatiivsed on õigusmõisted, mis võivad grammatilisele identsusele vaatamata omada erinevates õigusharudes lahknevaid tähendusi. Nii on Eesti kohtupraktikas ehk tuntumaid valduse mõistega seonduv, mille sisu on tsiviil- ja karistusõiguses osaliselt erinev ja seega võib sama mõiste kohaldamine samadele faktilistele asjaoludele viia õigusharu kaupa diametraalselt erinevate tulemusteni. Karistusseadustiku § 2172 lg-s 1 sätestatud usalduse kuritarvitamise koosseis on, mitte ainult märkimisväärses osas, vaid pigem otseselt üles ehitatud relatiivsetele õigusmõistele: mõisted kohustus, vara, kahju ja rikkumine on kõik pigem peaasjalikult tsiviilõiguse juurde kuuluvad, ent siiski KarS § 2172 selgroo moodustavad mõisted. Nagu viidatud seoses valdusega, võib ka nimetatud mõistete erinev sisustamine karistusõiguse (KarS § 2172) ja tsiviilõiguse sees viia olukorrani, kus kaks õigusharu reageerivad ühele ja samale situatsioonile erinevalt. Kui vaadelda karistus- ja tsiviilõigust suurema süsteemi õigus osasüsteemina, võib see tekitada süsteemi õigus sees keerukust – õiguse subjektil on raske ette näha, milline on tema käitumise õiguslik järelm, kuna üks ja sama mõiste võib tähendada ainuüksi süsteemi õigus sees erinevat. Mingeid selgeid reegleid õigusharude vahel relatiivsete õigusmõistete sisustamiseks ei eksisteeri, mistõttu on vajalik sisuliselt igal üksikjuhul otsustada, kas tolereerida keerukuse teket või püüda seda vähendada, sisustades relatiivseid õigusmõisteid võimalikult lähedaselt. Doktoritöös võetakse positsioon, et süsteemi õigus täielik süsteemne koherentsus ei ole võimalik, tegemist on pigem arhetüübiga, mille poole õigus kui terviklik süsteem peaks püüdlema, ent konkreetne sisustamine peab olema erinevate väärtuste kaalumise tulem.
Relative are legal concepts that may be attributed with different meanings in different fields of law although being grammatically identical. The most well known example of such a situation that has occurred in Estonian legal practices is the case with the concept of possession, which has received partly different meanings in civil and criminal law and as a result the application of the concept on identical facts in the two aforementioned fields of law may lead into significantly different results. Section 2172 of the Estonian Criminal Code is not only to a significant extent but rather in its fundamental part based on relative legal concepts: concepts as obligation, property, damage and breach of obligations are at first side more intrinsic to civil law but form the backbone of the offence of Section 2172. As was the case with possession, giving different meanings to the notions in criminal law (Section 2172) and civil law can lead into a situation where two fields of law react utterly different to one situation. If one takes both criminal and civil law as subsystems of a larger system law, such a situation may cause complexity within the system – a person cannot foresee what may be the legal consequence of his or her actions as one concept in law can mean different things in different fields of law. There are no clear-cut principles on how to determine the meanings of relative legal concepts, hence the decision whether to reduce or create complexity must be decided in each single case of interpretation. The position is taken in the doctoral thesis that absolute systemic coherence within the system of law is impossible, one should take the principle of systemic coherence rather as an archetype, towards which law as a system ought to strive, the actual definition of concepts should be a result of weighing of different values.
Relative are legal concepts that may be attributed with different meanings in different fields of law although being grammatically identical. The most well known example of such a situation that has occurred in Estonian legal practices is the case with the concept of possession, which has received partly different meanings in civil and criminal law and as a result the application of the concept on identical facts in the two aforementioned fields of law may lead into significantly different results. Section 2172 of the Estonian Criminal Code is not only to a significant extent but rather in its fundamental part based on relative legal concepts: concepts as obligation, property, damage and breach of obligations are at first side more intrinsic to civil law but form the backbone of the offence of Section 2172. As was the case with possession, giving different meanings to the notions in criminal law (Section 2172) and civil law can lead into a situation where two fields of law react utterly different to one situation. If one takes both criminal and civil law as subsystems of a larger system law, such a situation may cause complexity within the system – a person cannot foresee what may be the legal consequence of his or her actions as one concept in law can mean different things in different fields of law. There are no clear-cut principles on how to determine the meanings of relative legal concepts, hence the decision whether to reduce or create complexity must be decided in each single case of interpretation. The position is taken in the doctoral thesis that absolute systemic coherence within the system of law is impossible, one should take the principle of systemic coherence rather as an archetype, towards which law as a system ought to strive, the actual definition of concepts should be a result of weighing of different values.
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varavastased kuriteod, karistusõigus, seaduste tõlgendamine, tsiviilõigus, võlaõigus, võrdlev õigusteadus, Eesti, Saksamaa, crimes against property, penal law, law interpretation, civil law, tort law, comparative law, Estonia, Germany