How does violent conflict affect paradiplomacy? An exploratory research with cases from the North Caucasus
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2022-10-06
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Abstract
Ülemaailmne suundumus kodusõdade rahvusvahelistumise suunas on toonud uut tähelepanu sisekonfliktide rahvusvahelisele mõõtmele. Kuberneride rolli nendes protsessides ei ole piisavalt uuritud. Millised on vägivaldsete konfliktide tagajärjed osariikide kuberneride rahvusvahelistele kohustustele? Võttes kasutusele paradiplomaatia raamistiku, tehakse selles lõputöös ettepanek vaadelda kubernere kui aktiivseid osalejaid rahvusvahelistes suhetes, kes on valmis kaasama välispartnereid vastuseks vägivaldsele konfliktile nende territooriumil. Selles mõttes on tegemist induktiivse uurimistööga, mis põhineb teoreetiliselt põhjendatud uurimisprobleemil ja püüab täita lünka meie teadmistes.
Paradiplomaatia käsitleb üksikute osariikide (või "piirkondade") valitsuste erinevaid vorme, mõjusid ja tagajärgi, mis suhtlevad partneritega väljaspool oma riigi piire. Kuberneride rahvusvahelisi suhteid nimetatakse kirjanduses tavaliselt "paradiplomaatiaks", st diplomaatiaks, mis toimub paralleelselt keskvalitsuse diplomaatiaga. Lecours (2002), tuginedes institutsionaalsele teooriale, käsitas paradiplomaatiat, mis on raamitud võimaluste struktuuridega, mis on osariigi piirkonnale eksogeensed. Need struktuurid võivad olla rahvusvahelised (nt globaliseerumine) või siseriiklikud (nt keskvalitsuse poliitika) ning on sügavalt juurdunud piirkonna ajaloos ja geopoliitilistes oludes (Duran 2015). Jätkan siis arusaamisega, et vägivaldne konflikt mõjutab nii osariigi alamregioonide võimalusi osaleda paradiplomaatias kui ka nende regioonide kuberneride tegevuskavasid välismaal. Just neil põhjustel asusin uurima vägivaldse konflikti mõju paradiplomaatiale.
See uuring hõlmab paradiplomaatia lühiajaliste muutuste süstemaatilist analüüsi, antud juhul vägivaldse konflikti ilmnemisel. Uurimisküsimusele vastamiseks ülalmainitud eelduste alusel olen valinud oma uurimisstrateegiaks sarnaste juhtumite ja kontrolljuhtumite ajalooliselt põhjendatud väikese ja võrdleva uuringu. Kuigi riikidel on oodatav hulk rahvusvahelisi institutsioone (nt saatkonnad, ÜRO asukohad, välisministeeriumid), ei ole osariikidest madalamad piirkonnad riigi domineeritud rahvusvahelises süsteemis seaduslikud osalejad (Bartmann 2006), seega on nende lähenemine rahvusvahelistele suhetele riigiti erinev (Criekemans 2010). See varieeruvus on nii üleminekumuutuste kui ka pikaajaliste suundumuste tulemus, mida tuleks mõista paradiplomaatia muutuste jälgimiseks (Duran
2015). Valides juhtumid ühest riigist ja samast ajavahemikust, võin eeldada sarnaseid põhiseaduslikke ja poliitilisi tingimusi välismaal tegutsevatele kuberneridele.
Minu valitud juhtumid on kõik Vene Föderatsioonis. Need on Dagestan, Inguššia, Kabardi-Balkaria ja Põhja-Osseetia, kusjuures viimane toimib kontrolljuhtumina. Need kõik on naaberpiirkonnad, millel on sarnased Venemaaga jõulise integratsiooni ajalood. Need on ka kõik piirkonnad, kus mittevene vähemused moodustavad suurema osa elanikkonnast. Ja nad kõik jagavad seda, et nad asuvad perifeerses kohas, eemal Venemaa ja teiste riikide jõukeskustest ning neil on väike piirkondlik majandus. Ülioluline on see, et vägivaldsed konfliktid suurenesid neil kõigil, kuna Imrat Kavkazi juhitud Põhja-Kaukaasia mässud 2000. aastal ja 2010. aasta alguses võimutsesid. Nendes piirkondades saavutasid konfliktidega seotud ohvrid haripunkti 2010. aasta alguses, seega kasutan nelja aastat 2010–2013 hoolika analüüsi ajaraamina. Põhja-Osseetia toimib kontrolljuhtumina, kuna seal ei esinenud samal perioodil sarnast vägivalla kasvu.
Nende nelja juhtumi paradiplomaatia muutuste tuvastamiseks keskendusin lühi- ja pikaajalistele suundumustele. Esiteks jälgisin piirkondade omariikluse ja rahvusvaheliste kohustuste pikaajalist arengut, eesmärgiga mõista nende püsivaid geopoliitilisi olusid. Teiseks jälgisin lühiajalisi suundumusi kõigi juhtude andmekogumiga, kus nende nelja piirkonna
kubernerid ja kaks asjaomast ministeeriumi suhtlesid ametlikult ja avalikult välispartneritega ajavahemikus jaanuarist 2010 kuni detsembrini 2013. Andmekogum tuvastas kokku 178
Venemaa territooriumil ja välismaal peetud kohtumist. Igaüks neist oli kodeeritud välispartneri riigi ja kohtumise peamise eesmärgi järgi. Muutus registreeriti ajalooliste pikaajaliste suundumuste taustal, Vene Föderatsiooni paradiplomaatia laiemate suundumuste taustal, nagu on dokumenteerinud Stremoukhov (2021), andmestikus tuvastatud lühiajaliste suundumuste taustal. Lisaks võimaldas väikesemahuline uurimistöö ka empiiriliselt rikkalikult kirjeldada analüüsiperioodi jooksul toimunud juriidilisi, institutsionaalseid ja poliitilisi muutusi kõigil neil juhtudel.
Tõepoolest, muutusi täheldati nii kvantitatiivses kui ka kvalitatiivses mõttes. Esiteks jäi koosolekute intensiivsus suure konfliktiga piirkondades samaks ja vähenes kontrollpiirkonnas. Teiseks toimusid kõikides kõrge konfliktiintensiivsusega piirkondades üht- või teist laadi institutsionaalsed muutused, näiteks moodustati uued ministeeriumid ja võeti kasutusele uued poliitilised programmid. Sarnaseid muutusi kontrollpiirkonnas ei täheldatud. Kolmandaks, kolm konfliktist mõjutatud piirkonda nägid oma paradiplomaatia ümbersuunamist selle rakendamisel, demonstreerides uusi territorialiseerumise mustreid (Dagestan), uusi rahvusvahelistumise strateegiaid (Inguššia) ja keskvalitsuse suuremat kontrolli (Kabardi-Balkaria). Kontrolljuhtum (Põhja-Osseetia) ei näidanud paradiplomaatia lähenemisviisi ümbersuunamist. Neljandaks oli rahvusvahelise üldsuse tähelepanu humanitaarkaalutlustel nähtav kõigil juhtudel, kuigi kontrolljuhtumi puhul vähem intensiivsusega. Lõpuks, kõigil juhtudel, välja arvatud kontrolljuhtum, oesines juhtumeid, kus vägivaldne konflikt segas nende rahvusvahelisi kohustusi, hoides potentsiaalseid välispartnereid nendega suhtlemast.
Lõputöö lõpetuseks pakkudes välja vastus uurimisküsimusele, mis on mõeldud tulevasteks kinnitusuuringuteks. Vastus on, et vägivaldne konflikt asetab osariikide piirkondade paradiplomaatia viiele erinevale, kuigi mõnikord kattule trajektoorile. Need on nimelt tsentraalselt kehtestatud kohustused, tsentraalselt kehtestatud järelevalve, tsentraalselt kehtestatud piirangud ja vägivald kui partnereid eemale tõukav ja sisse tõmbav tegur. Need vastused viitavad tärkavale arusaamisele, et riik on isegi globaliseerumise, konfliktide ja paralleeldiplomaatia kontekstis võimeline manööverdama, säilitama oma tegevusvabaduse ja tegutsema neis tingimustes.
The world-wide trend of internationalising civil wars has brought new attention to the international dimension of otherwise domestic conflicts. The role of governors in these processes has been under-scrutinised. What are the effects of violent conflict for the international engagements of sub-state governors? By adopting the paradiplomacy framework, this thesis proposes to look at governors as proactive participants in international relations with a disposition to engage foreign partners in response to violent conflict in their territories. In this sense, this is an inductive exploratory research proceeding on the basis of a theory-informed research problem trying to fill a gap in our knowledge. Paradiplomacy concerns itself with the various forms, effects and implications of sub-state governments (or ‘regions’) engaging with partners outside of the borders of their country. The international relations of governors are usually referred to by the literature as ‘paradiplomacy’, i.e. diplomacy happening in parallel to that of the central government. Lecours (2002), drawing from institutional theory, conceptualised paradiplomacy as framed by opportunity structures that are exogenous to the sub-state region. These structures may be international (e.g. globalisation) or domestic (e.g. central government policy), and are deeply rooted in the history and geopolitical circumstances of the region (Duran 2015). I proceed then with the understanding that violent conflict impacts both the opportunity structures of sub-state regions to engage in paradiplomacy and the agenda pursued abroad by the governors of said regions. It is on these grounds that I set out to explore the effects of violent conflict on paradiplomacy. This exploration implies a systematic analysis of short-term change in paradiplomacy, in this case, when violent conflict arises. To answer the research question under the assumptions mentioned above, I chose as a research strategy to make a historically-grounded, small-n comparative study of similar cases and a control case. Whilst countries have an expected set of international institutions (e.g. embassies, UN seats, foreign ministries), sub-state regions are not legitimate participants in the state-dominated international system (Bartmann 2006), so their approach to international relations varies from country to country (Criekemans 2010). This variation is the product of both junctural change and long-term trends, both of which must be understood to trace change in paradiplomacy (Duran 2015). By choosing cases from a single country and the same time period, I can assume similar constitutional and political conditions for governors acting abroad. The cases I chose are all in the Russian Federation. These are Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, with this latter one functioning as the control case. These are all neighbouring regions with similar histories of forceful integration into Russia. They are also all regions where non-Russian minorities make up the majority of the population. And, they all share being in a peripheral location, away from Russia’s power centres and those of other countries, as well as having small regional economies. Crucially, they all experienced increases in violent conflict as the North Caucasus insurgency under Imrat Kavkaz took hold in the 2000 and early 2010 decades. For these regions, conflict-related casualties peaked in the early 2010 decade, so my timeframe for close analysis is the four years between 2010 to 2013. North Ossetia acts as the control case as it experienced no similar increase in violence during the same period. To identify changes in the paradiplomacy of these four cases, I focused on short- and long-term trends. First, I traced the long-term evolution of the regions’ statehood and international engagements, with the goal of understanding their enduring geopolitical circumstances. Second, I traced the short-term trends with a dataset of all instances where the governors and two relevant ministries of these four regions interacted with foreign partners in an official and overt capacity between January 2010 and December 2013. The dataset identified a total of 178 meetings held inside Russian territory and abroad. Each one of these was coded for the country of the foreign counterpart and the primary goal of the meeting. Change was registered against the background of historical long-term trends, the broader trends in paradiplomacy in the Russian Federation as documented by Stremoukhov (2021), the short-term trends identified in the dataset. In addition, the small-n research design allowed also for an empirically rich description of the legal, institutional and political changes in each one of these cases during the period of analysis. Indeed, change was observed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. First, the intensity of meetings remained the same in those regions with high conflict intensity and diminished in the control region. Second, all regions with high levels of conflict intensity experienced institutional change of one kind or another, such as new ministries formed and new political programmes introduced. No similar changes were observed in the control region. Three, the three conflict-affected regions saw their paradiplomacy redirect in its implementation exhibiting new patterns of territorialisation (Dagestan), new strategies for internationalisation (Ingushetia) and increased central government scrutiny (Kabardino-Balkaria). The control case (North Ossetia) exhibited no redirection of its paradiplomacy approach. Four, international attention on humanitarian grounds was visible in all cases, albeit with a diminishing intensity in the control case. Finally, in all cases except the control one saw instances where violent conflict spoiled their international engagements, deterring would-be foreign partners from engaging with them. The thesis concludes by proposing an answer to the research question, an answer meant for future confirmatory research. The answer is that violent conflict sets the paradiplomacy of sub-state regions on five different – although sometimes overlapping – trajectories. These are, namely, centrally-imposed engagements, centrally-imposed monitoring, centrally-imposed restrictions, and violence as a factor pushing partners away and as a factor pulling them in. Implicit in these answers is the emerging understanding that the state, even in conditions of globalisation, conflict and parallel diplomacy, is capable to manoeuvre, retain its agency and act through these conditions.
The world-wide trend of internationalising civil wars has brought new attention to the international dimension of otherwise domestic conflicts. The role of governors in these processes has been under-scrutinised. What are the effects of violent conflict for the international engagements of sub-state governors? By adopting the paradiplomacy framework, this thesis proposes to look at governors as proactive participants in international relations with a disposition to engage foreign partners in response to violent conflict in their territories. In this sense, this is an inductive exploratory research proceeding on the basis of a theory-informed research problem trying to fill a gap in our knowledge. Paradiplomacy concerns itself with the various forms, effects and implications of sub-state governments (or ‘regions’) engaging with partners outside of the borders of their country. The international relations of governors are usually referred to by the literature as ‘paradiplomacy’, i.e. diplomacy happening in parallel to that of the central government. Lecours (2002), drawing from institutional theory, conceptualised paradiplomacy as framed by opportunity structures that are exogenous to the sub-state region. These structures may be international (e.g. globalisation) or domestic (e.g. central government policy), and are deeply rooted in the history and geopolitical circumstances of the region (Duran 2015). I proceed then with the understanding that violent conflict impacts both the opportunity structures of sub-state regions to engage in paradiplomacy and the agenda pursued abroad by the governors of said regions. It is on these grounds that I set out to explore the effects of violent conflict on paradiplomacy. This exploration implies a systematic analysis of short-term change in paradiplomacy, in this case, when violent conflict arises. To answer the research question under the assumptions mentioned above, I chose as a research strategy to make a historically-grounded, small-n comparative study of similar cases and a control case. Whilst countries have an expected set of international institutions (e.g. embassies, UN seats, foreign ministries), sub-state regions are not legitimate participants in the state-dominated international system (Bartmann 2006), so their approach to international relations varies from country to country (Criekemans 2010). This variation is the product of both junctural change and long-term trends, both of which must be understood to trace change in paradiplomacy (Duran 2015). By choosing cases from a single country and the same time period, I can assume similar constitutional and political conditions for governors acting abroad. The cases I chose are all in the Russian Federation. These are Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, with this latter one functioning as the control case. These are all neighbouring regions with similar histories of forceful integration into Russia. They are also all regions where non-Russian minorities make up the majority of the population. And, they all share being in a peripheral location, away from Russia’s power centres and those of other countries, as well as having small regional economies. Crucially, they all experienced increases in violent conflict as the North Caucasus insurgency under Imrat Kavkaz took hold in the 2000 and early 2010 decades. For these regions, conflict-related casualties peaked in the early 2010 decade, so my timeframe for close analysis is the four years between 2010 to 2013. North Ossetia acts as the control case as it experienced no similar increase in violence during the same period. To identify changes in the paradiplomacy of these four cases, I focused on short- and long-term trends. First, I traced the long-term evolution of the regions’ statehood and international engagements, with the goal of understanding their enduring geopolitical circumstances. Second, I traced the short-term trends with a dataset of all instances where the governors and two relevant ministries of these four regions interacted with foreign partners in an official and overt capacity between January 2010 and December 2013. The dataset identified a total of 178 meetings held inside Russian territory and abroad. Each one of these was coded for the country of the foreign counterpart and the primary goal of the meeting. Change was registered against the background of historical long-term trends, the broader trends in paradiplomacy in the Russian Federation as documented by Stremoukhov (2021), the short-term trends identified in the dataset. In addition, the small-n research design allowed also for an empirically rich description of the legal, institutional and political changes in each one of these cases during the period of analysis. Indeed, change was observed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. First, the intensity of meetings remained the same in those regions with high conflict intensity and diminished in the control region. Second, all regions with high levels of conflict intensity experienced institutional change of one kind or another, such as new ministries formed and new political programmes introduced. No similar changes were observed in the control region. Three, the three conflict-affected regions saw their paradiplomacy redirect in its implementation exhibiting new patterns of territorialisation (Dagestan), new strategies for internationalisation (Ingushetia) and increased central government scrutiny (Kabardino-Balkaria). The control case (North Ossetia) exhibited no redirection of its paradiplomacy approach. Four, international attention on humanitarian grounds was visible in all cases, albeit with a diminishing intensity in the control case. Finally, in all cases except the control one saw instances where violent conflict spoiled their international engagements, deterring would-be foreign partners from engaging with them. The thesis concludes by proposing an answer to the research question, an answer meant for future confirmatory research. The answer is that violent conflict sets the paradiplomacy of sub-state regions on five different – although sometimes overlapping – trajectories. These are, namely, centrally-imposed engagements, centrally-imposed monitoring, centrally-imposed restrictions, and violence as a factor pushing partners away and as a factor pulling them in. Implicit in these answers is the emerging understanding that the state, even in conditions of globalisation, conflict and parallel diplomacy, is capable to manoeuvre, retain its agency and act through these conditions.
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Keywords
military conflicts, foreign relations, Northern Caucasia, Russia, diplomacy