Dancing with the devil: the populist radical right of Georgia and its Russian affinity
| dc.contributor.advisor | Nodia, Ghia, juhendaja | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wierenga, Louis John, juhendaja | |
| dc.contributor.author | Blichfeldt, Viktor Jørgen | |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste valdkond | et |
| dc.contributor.other | Tartu Ülikool. Johan Skytte poliitikauuringute instituut | et |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-02T10:15:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-02T10:15:03Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The affable relationship between the European populist radical right and the Russian regime is well-documented and longstanding. However, the various populist radical right parties in Europe are not a monolith: the Western European parties tend to have a positive attitude towards Russia, while in Central and Eastern Europe, attitudes range from outright positive to staunchly hostile, with geographical proximity and historical animosity being the deciding factors in engendering negative attitudes towards Russia. However, the populist radical right of Georgia stands out as an aberration, with a uniformly positive attitude despite its geographical proximity and centuries of conflict with Russia. Most explanations of this affinity have focused on allegations of Russian financial or political support for the Georgian populist radical right, arguing that they are simple stooges to the Kremlin. This approach, however, overlooks local motivations for far-right and Russian-friendly sentiments, ignores the agency of the populist radical right and the ideological attraction of the Russian regime. Instead, to thoroughly elucidate this apparent tension, this thesis relied on qualitative thematic analyses of social media posts made by two emblematic representatives of Georgia's populist radical right—the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia and the Conservative Movement—along with two field interviews of their leaders. The findings highlight an underappreciated phenomenon, namely the ability of Russia to engender genuine ideological attraction, which, in the case of the Georgian populist radical right, is bolstered by perceptions of mutual connections and pragmatic relations between the two countries. This affinity is further driven by perceived threats to Georgia’s cultural and political sovereignty, emanating from a hegemonic liberal West, along with alleged threats to Georgia’s territorial sovereignty posed by imperialist Turkey, bolstered by feelings of geographical isolation. | en |
| dc.description.uri | https://www.ester.ee/record=b5642805*est | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10062/93938 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | et |
| dc.publisher | Tartu Ülikool | et |
| dc.rights | openAccess | et |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject.other | magistritööd | et |
| dc.subject.other | paremäärmuslus | et |
| dc.subject.other | populism | et |
| dc.subject.other | Gruusia (riik) | et |
| dc.subject.other | Venemaa | et |
| dc.title | Dancing with the devil: the populist radical right of Georgia and its Russian affinity | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | et |