Body schema: a solution to the epistemic dilemma of constrained imagination

Abstract

This bachelor’s thesis investigates the epistemic role of imagination in response to the criticism that imagination cannot justify or play a role in the justification of knowledge. The work is built around the framework proposed by Amy Kind (Imagination under Constraints) and addresses the dilemma posed to her by Arnon Levy and Ori Kinberg. The dilemma presents a skeptical argument against the epistemic power of imagination, claiming that either the epistemic role of imagination is trivialized if the constraints are operating explicitly, or it remains mysterious and unexplained if they are applied implicitly. This thesis proposes the concept of the body schema from the theory of embodied cognition as a response to the dilemma, reinforcing Kind’s framework. The body schema links imagination to bodily experience, providing constrained reality-based simulations without collapsing into hypothetical reasoning or a mysterious “black box.” Although the response primarily applies to action-oriented imaginings, the argument still rebuts the absolute skeptical claim about the epistemic power of imagination. This also opens the way for further development of the framework and investigation of constraints in other types of imagination.