The emotion of guilt: integrating cases without perceived wrongdoing
Laen...
Kuupäev
Autorid
Ajakirja pealkiri
Ajakirja ISSN
Köite pealkiri
Kirjastaja
Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus
Abstrakt
Süütundest räägitakse tihti kui emotsioonist, mis seisneb asjaolus, et ollakse midagi moraalselt valesti teinud. Samas raporteerivad inimesed süütunnet ka olukordades, kus nad ei pruugi tajuda, et oleksid moraalselt eksinud. Üheks tüüpjuhtumiks on kahju põhjustamise näited, kus moraalset eksimust ei ole – näiteks autoõnnetused, kus põhjustati küll kellegi surm, kuid seejuures poleks autojuht saanud midagi teisiti teha. Teiseks tüüpjuhtumiks on ellujääja süütunne, mida tuntakse siis, kui pääsetakse eluga mõnest katastroofist, kust paljud teised hukkuvad. Käesolev doktoritöö näitab, et selline rahvapsühholoogias levinud avaram süüdiskursus ei ole vaid üks lõtv ja segane viis süütundest kõneleda. Vastupidi, see püüab kinni suhteliselt koherentse süümõiste, mis võrsub hüvepõhisest lähenemisest moraalile. Sellises lähenemises ei ole fookus mitte tegude ebamoraalsusel, vaid asjade seisude moraalsel halbusel, ning süütunne seisneb selles, et ennast tajutakse panustavat moraalselt halba asjade seisu. Seejuures on panustamist mõistetud kontrafaktuaalses tähenduses, mis rõhutab seda, et subjekt teeb maailma vahe sisse. Näiteks, kui ei oleks teatud kellaajal teatud teel sõidetud, siis poleks kõne all olevat õnnetust juhtunud. Või kui subjekt oleks hukkunud koos teistega, siis oleks juhtunu vähemalt teatud mõttes vähem halb olnud. Hüvepõhine lähenemine pakub tüüpjuhtumitele järgneva selgituse. Kahju põhjustamise näidete puhul panustatakse kausaalsel viisil moraalselt halba asjade seisu, mis seisneb enamasti selles, et juhtunu on ohvri suhtes ebaõiglane – ohver polnud oma halba saatust millegagi ära teeninud. Ellujääja süütunde puhul panustatakse konstitutiivsel viisil moraalselt halba asjade seisu, mis seisneb selles, et subjekti pääsemine on hukkunute suhtes, kes polnud subjektist kuidagi vähem väärilised, võrdlevas mõttes ebaõiglane. Suures plaanis näitab doktoritöö seda, kuidas süümõiste oleneb suurel määral meie üldisest normatiivsest raamistikust.
The emotional phenomenon of guilt is traditionally defined as a painful feeling about having done something morally wrong. Yet it is relatively common that people report guilt feelings even in the absence of perceived moral wrongdoing. One common type of counterexample involves cases of merely causal harm to others—for example, when one has caused fatal harm in a car crash, even though there was nothing that they could have done to prevent the accident. The second common type of counterexample concerns survivor guilt, which is experienced when the subject survives a catastrophe that others did not. This dissertation shows that such folk discourse is not just a confused way of talking about guilt but captures a relatively unified guilt concept, which emerges from a value-based approach to morality. This approach puts the focus on the badness of states of affairs rather than the wrongness of actions, and the relevant guilt feeling involves perceiving oneself as contributing to a morally bad state of affairs. Contribution is here understood in counterfactual terms, which highlights the idea that the subject makes a difference to the world. For example, had the subject not driven a particular road at a particular time, the relevant accident would not have happened. Had the subject died with the others, the situation would have been, at least in some sense, less bad. The value-based account of guilt offers the following way to explain the cases of merely causal harm and survivor guilt. The former involve the subject perceiving themselves as causing a state of affairs that is unjust towards the victim, who had done nothing to deserve such a fate. Survivor guilt involves the subject perceiving themselves as a constitutive part of a morally bad state of affairs that consists in the comparative injustice of the fact that while they made it out alive, others who were no less worthy did not. In general, the dissertation shows how our understanding of guilt depends in great part on our general normative framework.
The emotional phenomenon of guilt is traditionally defined as a painful feeling about having done something morally wrong. Yet it is relatively common that people report guilt feelings even in the absence of perceived moral wrongdoing. One common type of counterexample involves cases of merely causal harm to others—for example, when one has caused fatal harm in a car crash, even though there was nothing that they could have done to prevent the accident. The second common type of counterexample concerns survivor guilt, which is experienced when the subject survives a catastrophe that others did not. This dissertation shows that such folk discourse is not just a confused way of talking about guilt but captures a relatively unified guilt concept, which emerges from a value-based approach to morality. This approach puts the focus on the badness of states of affairs rather than the wrongness of actions, and the relevant guilt feeling involves perceiving oneself as contributing to a morally bad state of affairs. Contribution is here understood in counterfactual terms, which highlights the idea that the subject makes a difference to the world. For example, had the subject not driven a particular road at a particular time, the relevant accident would not have happened. Had the subject died with the others, the situation would have been, at least in some sense, less bad. The value-based account of guilt offers the following way to explain the cases of merely causal harm and survivor guilt. The former involve the subject perceiving themselves as causing a state of affairs that is unjust towards the victim, who had done nothing to deserve such a fate. Survivor guilt involves the subject perceiving themselves as a constitutive part of a morally bad state of affairs that consists in the comparative injustice of the fact that while they made it out alive, others who were no less worthy did not. In general, the dissertation shows how our understanding of guilt depends in great part on our general normative framework.
Kirjeldus
Märksõnad
doktoritööd