The mental maps of American decision makers and their impact on U.S. foreign policy toward Russia, 1992-1994
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As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the United States—now the sole superpower on the world stage—faced the unprecedented challenge of redefining its relationship with a Russia that was undergoing economic crises and political reforms. Through thematic analysis of over one hundred declassified documents and oral histories, this research examines the cognitive frameworks—or “mental maps”—held by key U.S. policymakers in the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations, focusing on how “end of history” narratives combined to shape strategic U.S. decisions around critical issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, economic assistance, democracy promotion, and NATO enlargement. This research identifies five recurring mental maps in U.S. policymaker discourse: (1) faith in the liberal international order, (2) belief in the market-democracy “double-helix”, (3) an emphasis on the personal relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin, (4) the dual-track strategy of NATO enlargement and Russian engagement, and (5) cognitive dissonance among American policymakers trying to square the circle on policy toward the Kremlin. This study addresses a central puzzle: Why did U.S. policymakers maintain unwavering support for Boris Yeltsin and optimism about Russian democratic transition from 1992-1994, despite mounting evidence of authoritarian consolidation, economic failure, and rising nationalism? My hypothesis is that the mental maps of U.S. officials were heavily shaped by the presence of democracy promotion and market reform narratives following the end-of-history moment in the immediate post-Cold War period, as well as the warm personal relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin that undergirded U.S. support for Russia even as the latter started to dismantle Russia’s nascent democracy. This analysis demonstrates the prevalence and persistence of these mental maps across different policy domains, showing how these cognitive frameworks shaped policy discourse and outcomes even as Russian realities diverged from American expectations.