Filosoofia osakonna magistritööd – Master's theses

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    Do atemporal theories of quantum gravity presuppose the notion of time? A critical analysis of Henrik Zinkernagel's arguments against quantum fundamentalism
    (Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Lazutkina, Anastasiia; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Kustassoo, Karin, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
    This thesis is dedicated to examining three arguments against quantum fundamentalism (QF), the view that everything is fundamentally of a quantum nature and can be described exclusively in quantum theoretical terms. All three arguments rely on the timelessness of leading approaches to quantum gravity (QG), the successor theory of our two best physical theories, general relativity and quantum field theory. According to the first argument, by Svend Rugh and Henrik Zinkernagel, QF cannot explain how time emerges diachronically from a timeless quantum structure described by QG. I argue with Daniele Oriti that such a diachronic emergence is not strictly necessary, so the argument fails. According to the second argument, by Zinkernagel, timeless QG cannot be more fundamental than GR because its field of application is defined by a classical relativistic time concept. I propose two readings of the argument: the first fails, while the second is successful but requires accepting a broad set of epistemological commitments. The third argument adds that timeless QG does not imply that time is not fundamental, but instead that physics cannot describe it. I conclude that the last two arguments refute an epistemological but not ontological version of QF.
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    Open future in eternalist universe
    (Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Schimanski, Roland; Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
    In this thesis, will take up the question of open future in eternalist universe. At first glance, eternalism seems to exclude the possibility of open future, since all temporal locations exist on a par, and what ever will be the case in a future time t, is already the case in t. However, we have very strong intuitions about our future being open.Therefore, this Master’s Thesis attempts to find an answer to two research questions: (i) is any notion of open future compatible with eternalist universe; and (ii) if yes, then what would that notion of open future be? I phrase a tentative definition of open future: the future is open if it is not fixed. I will call this tentative notion the strong sense of open future.I will argue that we can have open future in a strong sense if we are willing to accept branching spacetime. If we are not willing to accept branching spacetime, then we can still construenotionof open future, albeitin a weak sense, that is compatible with eternalism. Then, I will argue, our future is open by virtue of decision-making.