Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Selle valdkonna püsiv URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/10062/28901
Sirvi
Sirvi Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut Pealkiri järgi
Nüüd näidatakse 1 - 20 487
- Tulemused lehekülje kohta
- Sorteerimisvalikud
listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , 5G ohtude diskursuse konstrueerimine Eesti meedia näitel(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Tubelt, Ene; Madisson, Mari-Liis, juhendaja; Ventsel, Andreas, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A classical degree-theoretic treatment of the sorites paradox : master's thesis in philosophy(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Yau, Ching Hei; Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja; Frances, Bryan Reed Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondSince 1970s, degree-of-truth theory has been proposed as a solution to the Sorites paradox. However, one perennial attack to degree-of-truth theory is that its logic - fuzzy logic - is non-classical. Inspired by Gödel (1933), I attempt to better degree-of-truth theory by classicalizing it. That is, I attempt to give an interpretation of fuzzy logic within classical logic enriched by degree operators {⚪, ◔, ◑, ◕, ⚫} - “it is of no/low/moderate/high/full degree that …”. Intuitively, degree-of-truth is classicalized as classical bivalent truth-value and a largely independent notion of degrees. A formal semantics of this enriched classical logic is presented, from which two semantic consequences are derived. The two semantic consequences are applied to analyse the (in)validity of the Sorites argument. There are two results: 1. the validity of the standard Sorites argument is reasserted, 2. a new argument for the invalidity of the degreed version of the Sorites argument is presented.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A cognitive semiotic reading of the model of homo semioticus(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Gülmez, Deniz; Pärn, Katre; Rattasepp, Silver; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A comparative approach to tax exemption: differences between hospitals and religious institutions(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Wehbe, Wael; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondI study the position of religious institutions in matters of exemptions from paying taxes, the position is that religious institutions must be exempted from paying taxes in much of the same manner to hospitals since they are sufficiently similar with regard to taxation and legal status. I consider what might be required for this “sufficient similarity” to merit this equal legal status and resulting equal treatment by the state. I provide some justification of the tax exemptions hospitals receive and relate them to the three requirements for sufficient similarity. I then present three arguments against the three conditions of sufficient similarity. Lastly, I consider some objections to the conditions of sufficient similarity and the paper as a whole, I then provide some replies to these objections as best I can.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A critical analysis of "born this way" and "not a choice" arguments for the acceptance of queer sexualities(Tartu Ülikool, 2020) Kaling, Anna; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondBuilding on the criticism of the good track record argument, I presented an alternative argument for the acceptance of queer sexualities based on the personal freedom to engage in consensual non-heterosexual behaviour, that is not susceptible to the status versus conduct distinction. While the behaviour-based argument I presented does not rely on both philosophically and scientifically contested concept of sexual orientation and thus has several advantages in regard to it (such as greater potential for generalizability), I did not question the usefulness of the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity in this thesis. I also did not consider the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. An interesting analysis of these issues could be provided, for example on the basis of William S. Wilkerson’s fusion theory (Ambiguity and Sexuality, 2007) and his argument regarding the role of interpretation in determining sexual orientation (Wilkinson, 2009).listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A defence of the existence of emotions in birds(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) York, Kyle; Puusepp, Vivian, juhendaja; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondThis thesis demonstrates that (at least some) birds can feel emotions. First, it gives a methodological justification for how one can make such attributions in the first place. Then supplies behavioral and physiological evidence for emotions such as fear, anger, and affection. It goes on to defend the idea that birds have the neurological and cognitive capacities for emotions. It next turns towards cognitive and mental considerations, including intentionality, mental content, language-like thought, and making attributions of propositional attitudes and evaluative judgments to birds. It concludes by considering whether birds have human-like emotions or bird-relative ‘schmemotions’.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A moral ideal for international law: Vattel on state and territory(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Otsing, Henri; Piirimäe, Pärtel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondIn historia juris gentium contentiones convenire inter principia nationis libertatis et prosperitatis gentium iam diu notissimarum quaestionum fuit. Haec tractatio contradictionem in Ius Gentium de Vattelio (MDCCLVIII) promptam investigat, et censet Vattelium duo principia per notionem civitatis moralem convenire. Haec tractatio utpote enim putat notionem civitatum qua “personarum moralium” – ex proportione nationum et individuorum seu aequalitate adduxit – enodere aliquas causas in Vatteliano. Causae sunt hae divisa in partes tres. Prima, imperium proprium – accusationes colonialismi efficiens – etiam qua elementum societatis moralis gentium intellegi possit. Alia, recusationem Vattelii civitatis maximae fortasse significationem libertatis moralis nationis interpretatum possit, non defensionem civitatum minimarum. Et tertia, territorium civitatis per se ex corpore populi adductum est, sed adfert nullum latiorem nationalismum.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A non-moral critique of the norm of assumed objectivity(Tartu Ülikool, 2020-08) Närvänen, Emmi; Davies, Alex, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondSally Haslanger (2013) has described a particular norm of objectivity, the norm of Assumed Objectivity, that she considers as morally problematic. This norm, when correctly applied, permits one to form essentialising beliefs about women. According Haslanger, under the conditions of gender inequality, adopting hurts the interest of women while serving the interests of men. Rae Langton (1993), in contrast, has argued that a moral critique of the norm has its shortcomings: if a particular norm is bad for some and good for others, then the grounds for rejecting the norm are weak. Thus, Langton has provided a non-moral critique of the norm that pertains to the rationality of the norm. She argues that the norm should be rejected because it fails to yield knowledge. Evangelia Papadaki (2008) has pointed to an inconsistency in Langton’s argument thereby concluding that the norm evades Langton’s non-moral critique. In this thesis, I will set out to argue the norm is vulnerable to a non-moral critique. I will argue that the beliefs arrived at fail to constitute knowledge, which gives us a rational justification to reject the norm of Assumed Objectivitylistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A philosophical approach to CETI: developing a conceptual framework based on Umwelt theory(Tartu Ülikool, 2025) Pasha, Chingiz; Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondThis thesis critiques the assumptions underlying the argument of Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence (CETI) research, which presumes that extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) would possess human-like features and technologies, and that communication with ETI would rely on the information-transmission model. These premises are refuted by exposing their reliance on anthropocentric and vague definitions of "intelligence" and "communication." Afterward, a conceptual framework based on Umwelt theory is proposed to address these issues, emphasizing the diversity of subjective worlds (Umwelten) of organisms, the concept of "commonage" as shared aspects of these subjective worlds, and communication as the exchange of signs based on the commonage among organisms. Lastly, intelligence is redefined as a relational feature of shared Umwelten emerging from communication. The thesis argues for dividing CETI into two distinct research areas with a more explicit scope for each: the search for extraterrestrial organisms (SEO) and the discovery of terrestrial types of intelligence (DTI). Broader implications within philosophy, semiotics, and interdisciplinary research are also explored, emphasizing the necessity of avoiding the widespread anthropocentric approach in studying intelligence and communication.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A response to the practicality issue in the abolitionist animal rights framework(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Erik, Egle; Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondIn this thesis I have looked into the conflict between the abolitionist animal rights approach and the welfarist approach. The welfarists focus on animals’ right to not suffer, whilst the abolitionists recognize the animals’ right to life and that the root issue of animal suffering is their exploitation, predominantly in animal agriculture. The main way to implement abolitionist ideas into the real life is through veganism – the practice of abstaining from the use of animals in food as well as other areas of life. In the second chapter I looked into the criticism towards the abolitionist approach, according to which veganism as an ethical requirement is too demanding and unrealistic. I then explained how ethical requirements such as veganism sometimes have to be demanding yet can still have practical value by providing an ideal. In the third chapter I proposed a nonideal approach, according to which we ought to eat less meat as per secondary requirements. I also introduced a scalar approach to wrongness. This theoretical framework recognizes that some acts are more wrong than others, for example eating more meat is more wrong than eating less meat, yet we can maintain the ideal that eating meat still wrongs animals.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A semiotic analysis of the research paradigms behind the ape language experiments(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Cerrone, Mirko; Mäekivi, Nelly, supervisor; Maran, Timo, supervisor; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A semiotic model for smart home affordances: trajecting semiotic components in a technological living environment(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Kozicki, Alec; Kull, Kalevi; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A taxonomy of testimonial smothering(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Mohamed, Nada Abdalla Hassan Abdelazim; Barker, Simon Reginald, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondKristie Dotson formulates testimonial smothering as a form of testimonial oppression where a speaker truncates or removes the content of her testimony leaving the testimony empty from any content for which the hearers demonstrated testimonial incompetence. On Dotson’s account of smothering, the speaker empties her testimony from all content relevant to the domain of exchange. However, Dotson’s account does not include or cover instances where a speaker smothers her testimony, yet her smothered testimony contains some content relevant to the domain of exchange. In this thesis, I present a more detailed analysis of testimonial smothering to showcase different ways in which oppressed speakers interact in exchanges in which they are oppressed. I take Dotson’s notion of smothering to be one form of testimonial smothering, which I call smothering via emptying. I introduce two other types of smothering, smothering via altering and smothering via echoing, to encompass cases where a speaker’s smothered testimony is not empty from content relevant to the domain of exchange. Then I use the taxonomy of testimonial smothering to showcase ways in which oppressed speakers can contribute to conversations in which they are oppressed.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A Theosemiotic Reading of Hryhorii Skovoroda(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Bondarenko, Anastasiia; Salupere, Silvi; Põder, Thomas-Andreas; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , A translation theoretical approach to three interrelated phenomena: the dozens, reading, and vogue(Tartu Ülikool, 2017) Swafford, Andrew; Sütiste, Elin, supervisor; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , Abordidebatt - argument psühholoogilise persooni käsitluse kasuks(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Vitsut, Hell; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutBakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks on tutvustada filosoofilist aspekti abordidebatis, abordiga seostuvaid moraalseid probleeme ning võimalikke vastuseid. Põhiliseks ülesandeks on vastata küsimusele, millal on moraalselt lubatud teha aborti. Sellega seoses tuleb ka põhjendada, milline moraalne staatus on sündimata lapsel ning milline on see võrreldes täiskasvanud inimese ja emaga. Sündimata lapse moraalne staatus omistab tema suhtes ka teatud õigusi ja kohustusi, mille rikkumine peab olema piisavalt põhjendatud. Abordi moraalsus või ebamoraalsus on teema, mis tekitab sageli tugevaid emotsioone. Ühe vaate eest seisavad elupooldajad (pro-life), kes püüavad iga hinna eest sündimata laste tapmist peatada, ning teise eest valikupooldajad (pro-choice), kes näevad abordi keelamises naiste inimõiguste rikkumist. Tegu on moraalse probleemiga, mis ikka ja jälle muutub aktuaalseks nii läänes kui mujal. Maailmas leidub piirkondi, kus abort on karistatav surmanuhtlusega. Samuti on riike, kus seda nähakse enesestmõistetava inimõigusena. Kuigi tegemist võib olla levinud praktikaga, on see siiski kohati tabuteema, millest osalejad ei taha avalikult rääkida. Säärane hoiak on mõistetav, sest kuigi paljud inimesed ei pühenda aega abordi filosoofilisele mõtestamisele, on suuremale osale arusaadav, et selle käigus surmatakse keegi või miski tahtlikult. Tegu ei ole ka niisama tapmisega, vaid inimese või kellegi, kes kunagi võiks inimeseks saada, kaotamisega. Seega on tüüpiline, et isegi ühiskondades, kus aborti seaduslikult tõlgendatakse naise inimõigusena, eksisteerib paralleelselt arvamus, et seda peaks siiski varjama ning vältima. Nii nähakse raseduses midagi iseenesest väärtuslikku ja kohati püha, mis peaks olema rõõmustav, mitte kurvastav. Töös püüan just seda tundlikku teemat mõlemast vaatekohast esitada ning näidata, kuidas elu- ja valikupooldajad võivad näha sama moraalset probleemi kardinaalselt erinevalt.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , Aeglane film: tunnused, vahendid ja narratiivne struktuur(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Rood, Kadri; Torop, Peeter, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , Aegluse poeetika filmis(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Rood, Kadri; Torop, Peeter, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituutlistelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , Against epistemic partiality in friendship(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Ametefio, Saviour De-Graft; Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondIn conclusion, I have argued that epistemic partiality undermines friendship if we accept that friendship in a stricter sense is based on character. The argument I have present give two justification for that. The first is that when we allow an excellent friend to behave doxastically biased in favor of his friend consistently, this will promote more vices. Epistemic bias seems to be a bad epistemic practice. This is because knowingly leading away from the evidence and correct judgment of your friend's conduct is unjust. Cultivating such behavior in friendship will only corrupt the friendship. The second is that the fact that you esteem your friend’s character by deceptive means does not change the reality that the person has flaws in his character. When in our assessment of information about our friends, intentionally favor that which seek to portray him more favorably in a good light, we act deceptively. When we notice this shortcoming, we must correct it. The instrumental argument aims to encourage friends to help each other in their development as a person. Therefore, recognizing their flaws may be one of the ways to help them grow. In fact, in friendship relations that works well the idealization of your friend and the friendship itself helps in the longevity and flourishing of that relationship. However, if the bias becomes excessive and unwarranted, for example, if negative feedback is not considered at all or the positive attitudes towards your friend become unrealistically optimistic, then the bias may become dysfunctional.listelement.badge.dso-type Kirje , listelement.badge.access-status Avatud juurdepääs , Against the guise of the good(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakondThe Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.