Filosoofia osakond

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Abordidebatt - argument psühholoogilise persooni käsitluse kasuks
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Vitsut, Hell; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks on tutvustada filosoofilist aspekti abordidebatis, abordiga seostuvaid moraalseid probleeme ning võimalikke vastuseid. Põhiliseks ülesandeks on vastata küsimusele, millal on moraalselt lubatud teha aborti. Sellega seoses tuleb ka põhjendada, milline moraalne staatus on sündimata lapsel ning milline on see võrreldes täiskasvanud inimese ja emaga. Sündimata lapse moraalne staatus omistab tema suhtes ka teatud õigusi ja kohustusi, mille rikkumine peab olema piisavalt põhjendatud. Abordi moraalsus või ebamoraalsus on teema, mis tekitab sageli tugevaid emotsioone. Ühe vaate eest seisavad elupooldajad (pro-life), kes püüavad iga hinna eest sündimata laste tapmist peatada, ning teise eest valikupooldajad (pro-choice), kes näevad abordi keelamises naiste inimõiguste rikkumist. Tegu on moraalse probleemiga, mis ikka ja jälle muutub aktuaalseks nii läänes kui mujal. Maailmas leidub piirkondi, kus abort on karistatav surmanuhtlusega. Samuti on riike, kus seda nähakse enesestmõistetava inimõigusena. Kuigi tegemist võib olla levinud praktikaga, on see siiski kohati tabuteema, millest osalejad ei taha avalikult rääkida. Säärane hoiak on mõistetav, sest kuigi paljud inimesed ei pühenda aega abordi filosoofilisele mõtestamisele, on suuremale osale arusaadav, et selle käigus surmatakse keegi või miski tahtlikult. Tegu ei ole ka niisama tapmisega, vaid inimese või kellegi, kes kunagi võiks inimeseks saada, kaotamisega. Seega on tüüpiline, et isegi ühiskondades, kus aborti seaduslikult tõlgendatakse naise inimõigusena, eksisteerib paralleelselt arvamus, et seda peaks siiski varjama ning vältima. Nii nähakse raseduses midagi iseenesest väärtuslikku ja kohati püha, mis peaks olema rõõmustav, mitte kurvastav. Töös püüan just seda tundlikku teemat mõlemast vaatekohast esitada ning näidata, kuidas elu- ja valikupooldajad võivad näha sama moraalset probleemi kardinaalselt erinevalt.
Against epistemic partiality in friendship
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Ametefio, Saviour De-Graft; Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In conclusion, I have argued that epistemic partiality undermines friendship if we accept that friendship in a stricter sense is based on character. The argument I have present give two justification for that. The first is that when we allow an excellent friend to behave doxastically biased in favor of his friend consistently, this will promote more vices. Epistemic bias seems to be a bad epistemic practice. This is because knowingly leading away from the evidence and correct judgment of your friend's conduct is unjust. Cultivating such behavior in friendship will only corrupt the friendship. The second is that the fact that you esteem your friend’s character by deceptive means does not change the reality that the person has flaws in his character. When in our assessment of information about our friends, intentionally favor that which seek to portray him more favorably in a good light, we act deceptively. When we notice this shortcoming, we must correct it. The instrumental argument aims to encourage friends to help each other in their development as a person. Therefore, recognizing their flaws may be one of the ways to help them grow. In fact, in friendship relations that works well the idealization of your friend and the friendship itself helps in the longevity and flourishing of that relationship. However, if the bias becomes excessive and unwarranted, for example, if negative feedback is not considered at all or the positive attitudes towards your friend become unrealistically optimistic, then the bias may become dysfunctional.
Against the guise of the good
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
Against the narrative self
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Rehman, Ayesha; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Vivian Puusepp, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In my thesis, I argue against the narrative conception of self, the idea that our self is narrative in structure and that we live life as a narrative. First, I differentiate between the strong and weak narrative view of self. I classify Dennett and Bruner’s account as the strong claim, Schechtman and Cavarero’s as the weak narrative claim. Second, I reject both the descriptive and normative narrativity thesis. I question the universality of a Narrative outlook. I argue that the artificial constructing of a narrative self is not conducive to self-understanding and that our choices of structuring it might be limiting. Last, I defend the non-Narrative conception of self against the common objection that without a selfnarrative one cannot be held accountable. I discuss Eichmann’s defense in Jerusalem along the way to untangle the link between narrativity and accountability.
Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalne mõju väärtussüsteemidele
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Raud, Joosep; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesoleva töö eesmärk oli vaadelda Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalset mõju väärtussüsteemidele. Antud eesmärgi täitmiseks sai kaardistatud küsimuseks vajalikud temaatilised aspektid. Kõigepealt sai kaardistatud aju-arvuti tehnoloogia olemus ning selle potentsiaal kommunikatsioonivõimekust efektiivsemaks muuta. Vaadeldud sai väärtussüsteeme, eesmärgiga kaardistada hulk parameetreid mille kaudu oleks võimalik tööle keskset küsimust mõtestada. Antud parameetritest kõige kesksemal positsioonil seoses töö põhiteemaga oli väärtussüsteemide dünaamika. Antud peatüki juures sai kaardistatud dünaamika ehk kommunikatsiooni olemus väärtussüsteemide ning inimeste vahel. Järgnevalt sai vaadeldud kuidas dünaamika osas välja toodud aspektid muutuvad, kui nende juures eeldada aju-arvuti kooslusest tulenevat kommunikatsioonieelist.
Alienation and resignation: why don't we act against apocalyptic futures?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Gavrilin, Andrey; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Humanity faces apocalyptic futures which are the product of the current socio-economic system. However, the present response is insufficient. This thesis analyzes what prevents people from effectively acting against future catastrophes. In order to do so, I use climate change as the main example and employ a Marxist critique of capitalism. I argue that the insufficiency of current responses to catastrophic futures can be explained by Marx’s notion of alienation which is inherent to the current mode of production. In first three chapters I demonstrate different consequences of estranged labor. First, it makes people alienated not only from the fruits of their labor, but also from other people, thus preventing collective actions. Secondly, it disconnects individuals from the world which they collectively produce. Thirdly, it alienates individuals from a collectively produced future, affecting their perception of temporality and making them see the future as inevitable but eternally postponed. Thus, they become discouraged to act against the catastrophes which they collectively cause. In the fourth chapter I propose two philosophical solutions to this deadlock – Stoicism, which enables individual activity, and existentialism, which motivates people to act even if their struggle is absurd.
Animal research and objectivity
(Tartu Ülikool, 2017) Neemre, Eveli; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Oma magistritöös huvitusin ma loomauuringute objektiivsusest. Loomade uurimisega seondub interaktsioonist tulenev subjektiivne element, mis on vastuolus tavapärase arusaamaga objektiivsusest. Selle vastolu tõttu peetakse mõningaid loomauuringuid ebaobjektiivseks või suisa pseudoteaduslikuks. Esimeseks sammuks selle probleemi uurimisel selgitasin objektiivsuse mõistet. Selle käigus leidsin, et tavapärane arusaam objektiivsusest ja sellega kattuv arusaam absoluutsest objektiivsusest teaduses ei sobi tegelikult teadustöö loomusega. Nõustun Helen E. Longinoga, et teadus ja teadusloome on oma olemuselt sotsiaalsed ja seetõttu peaks ka objektiivsust mõistma sotsiaalselt, mitte individuaalselt nagu klassikalises arusaamas objektiivsusest. Minu teiseks sammuks oli uurida konkreetseid loomauuringute näiteid sotsiaalse objektiivsuse valguses, et näha kas loomauuringud saavad olla objektiivsed samadel alustel kui teised teadused. Keskendusin kahele suurele uurimissuunale loomauuringutes: loomade keeleprojektidele ja mõttelugemise eksperimentidele. Esimene neist, loomade keeleprojektid, ei olnud väga objektiivsed, kuna selle ala juhtivate projektide teadlased ei olnud võimelised kriitikale adekvaatselt reageerima ning seetõttu oli nende projektide objektiivsus kompromiteeritud. Mõttelugemise eksperimendid seevastu osutusid objektiivseteks, kuna uuringute algusest peale olid teadlased avatud kriitikale ja alternatiivsetele hüpoteesidele ning kriitikute ja teadlaste vahel toimus elav diskusioon, mis pani aluse uutele eksperimentidele ja uurimissuundadele. Järeldasin, et loomade uuringud võivad olla hoolimata neis sisalduvast subjektiivsest elemendist objektiivsed, kui loomadega tegelevad teadlased osalevad avatud kriitilises diskusioonis.
Antropotsentrismi õigustamine keskkonnaeetikas Bryan G. Nortoni nõrga antropotsentrismi näitel
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Kruusmäe, Juta; Keerus, Külli; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös käsitletakse keskkonnalaste kohustuste põhjendamist antropotsentriliselt ehk inimkeskselt. Töös keskendutakse ennekõike Bryan G. Nortoni artiklile ”Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism” (1984), kus esimest korda eristatakse tugevat antropotsentrismi nõrgast. Viimasega saab õigustada looduskaitset. Töö eesmärgiks on selgitada, kas Nortoni nõrga antropotsentrismi järgi teostatav looduskaitse on eetilisest vaatevinklist piisav. Looduse kaitsmise vajaduse põhjendamine on keskkonnaeetika üks keskseid ülesandeid, sest see eetika suund arutleb, millised kohutused on inimestel keskkonna ees. Tugeva antropotsentrismi järgi on inimeste kõik soovid ja vajadused samaväärsed, nii ei ole võimalik neid kritiseerida. Nortoni nõrk antropotsentrism esindab inimeste mitmekesisemaid väärtusi, kuhu kuulvad ka need, mis kritiseerivad loodust ekspluateerivaid väärtussüsteeme. Käesoleva töö põhiteesiks on, et nõrk antropotsentrism on piisav loodukaitse põhjendamiseks ehk muudetud antropotsentrism on õigustatud keskkonneetikas.
Are Reasons for Action Agent’s Psychological States or Facts of the World
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Reiljan, Merike; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Arendtian problem of new beginnings: beginnings and foundations of freedom in revolution
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Zhu, Zhiyi; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis explores the relationship between beginnings and foundations within the context of modern political revolutions. As Hannah Arend argued, the American Revolution, with its establishment of a federal republic and a Constitution inspired by ancient political traditions, provides a model for successful modern revolutions. Arendt's reinterpretation highlights the authentic unification between freedom and order through a mutual contract, where both elements reinforce each other. This unification is reflected in the constitution-making activity dominated by constituent power, bridging the gap between beginnings and established foundations. The processual nature of beginnings, as seen in the council system and revolutionary experiences, underscores that new political orders are extensions in time, seeking continuity by reconnecting with predecessors’ foundations. It means the beginning is the return to a previous beginning. Ultimately, this cyclical process transforms the new beginning into a stabilizing foundation, ensuring continuity and stability for future political structures.
Argumendid looduskeskkonna kaitseks Albert Schweitzeri essee “Aukartus elu ees” käsitluses
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Viik, Kerttu-Kaisa; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Loodushoiu teemad on tänapäeval taas rohkem aktualiseerunud, mis on tõeliselt oluline iga üksikisiku ning kogu ühiskonna jaoks. Keskkonnaeetikaga seonduvaid probleeme hakati algul teadvustama 1960. aastatel, kui inimeste halvad keskkonnaga seonduvad harjumused oleksid ühiskonna ökoloogilisse kriisi viinud. Sealt sai alguse mõistmine, et inimesed peavad oma keskkondlikku käitumist muutma hakkama. Keskkonnaeetika kui filosoofiline distsipliin sai alguse 1970. aastal. Traditsioonilised eetikakoolkonnad ei ole suutelised keskkonnaga seotud küsimustes adekvaatseid vastuseid andma, kuna need eetikasüsteemid seonduvad ikkagi eelkõige inimeste omavaheliste suhete ning seetõttu tekib nende läbi keskkonnaküsimustega seonduvat juureldes “sein ette”, kuna, nagu juba mainitud, on need piiratud inimesega ning seega oli tarvis, et eetika laieneks ja tekiks eraldi keskkonnaeetika distsipliin.
Artificial intelligence and agency
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Hosseinpour, Hesam; Mets, Ave, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
When it comes to thinking about artificial intelligence (AI), the possibility of its disobedience is usually considered as a threat to the human race. But here, I elaborate on a counterintuitive and optimistic approach that looks at disobedient AI as a promise, rather than a threat. First, I explain the problem of responsibility and the necessity of expanding the realm of agency in order to include AI machines as agents. Then, I introduce a standard approach to responsibility as an attempt to define agency for AI machines and explain the epistemological problem as the main issue with this account of responsibility. And in the last part, I use Foucault’s analysis of power to introduce a non-standard view of agency which explains how being an object of power is the condition of possibility of any kind of agency and draw this conclusion that through disobedience, AI machines will find their way to power relations and will promote to the position of agents.
Arvo Valtoni varajastest novellidest tõukuv debatt võõrandumise üle nõukogude eesti ühiskonnas. Filosoofiline vaade
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Aksiim, Maria; Parhomenko, Eduard, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Bakalaureusetöö keskendus 1960. aastate teises pooles Nõukogude Eesti ühiskonnas esile kerkinud võõrandumisteemalisele debatile, mille põhjustas väidetavate võõrandumise elementide olemasolu Arvo Valtoni novellides. Töö eesmärgiks oli vastata kolmele küsimusele: kas Arvo Valtoni novellides saab täheldada võõrandumisele viitavaid tunnuseid; missugused tingimused võisid panustada võõrandumise ilmnemisse Valtoni novellides ning missugused võisid olla need tegurid, mis aitasid kaasa Eduard Pälli ja Rem Blumi erinevate seisukohtade kujunemisele.
An assessment of Katharine Gelber's speaking back argument in the context of ethnic russians living in Estonia
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Stamberg, Renee; alexander Stewart Davies, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The thesis focused on assessing whether the speaking back policy presented by Katharine Gelber would work in a context like Estonia. I started by introducing hate speech, which is a growing problem in today's society. Hate speech causes harm to victims, which in turn diminishes the target’s speech capabilities and takes away their feeling of inclusion in society. I found that there are two ways to combat hate speech, one is speech restricting laws and the other is using alternative approaches such as the speaking back approach.
Ateism Thomas Hobbesi filosoofias
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Suur, Tiina; Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The purpose of my thesis is to find out whether there is any atheism in the philosophy of 17th century thinker Thomas Hobbes. To start with, I gave an introductory overview of Hobbes's life so it would be easier to understand what is the background he is coming from. Then I discussed three main subjects that are important in his philosophy: materialism, political philosophy about government, and theory of life after death. Firstly I made it clear what these three subjects are, secondly I brought forth his ideas that weren't presented clearly enough within these three topics that could indicate his possible atheism. For example Hobbes being a materialist and his reasoning about the existence of God. Lastly I presented the conclusions that I made relying on the analysis of these three subjects. I inferred that even though Hobbes was considered to be an atheist during his lifetime, nowadays he would rather be thought of as a deist and that because of the definition I gave for an atheist – atheist is a person who denies the existence of God. Hobbes did not deny it, quite the opposite, he said that God does exist but he doesn't intervene in people's lives. I also concluded that Hobbes was considered to be an atheist because his understandings of God did not match with the Christian understanding of God which was the dominant way of thinking back in the 17th century. In addition I added that the confusion in some places in his theories came from the pressure of the society. What is meant is that taking into account the dominant Christian way of thinking it was almost impossible to write any philosophy without considering God, that means that Hobbes had to say something about God even if it was not in consistency with his understandings of the world, for example his materialism. It is also important to understand that it can't be said with confidence that Hobbes was an atheist or a deist because in different centuries there have been different understandings of these concepts. He can be thought of as an atheist or as a deist only in the corresponding era.
Beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022-02) Hooda, Anurag; Jakapi, Roomet, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have argued how we can go beyond religious pluralism and exclusivism to tackle the existing issues in the society. To uncover the veil, I have begun by describing what is religion and various religious positions like exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. After clearing concepts next, I discuss Hick’s model of religious pluralism and explained the central pieces in model, like, his doctrine of the Real and how Hick utilized the brilliance of Kant’s epistemology of religion. After describing them I have defended Hick’s model against the arguments of exclusivist’s like Plantinga and Johnson. Further, I have argued that religious exclusivism is a dangerous position when compared with religious pluralism, as the latter is more tolerant. Then I have sketched a model of small r to capital R Religion, and argued that religious pluralism has its own problems and why it fails. Then finally I defend the ‘small r to capital R Religion’ model against possible objection.
Can Autonomous Machines Make Ethical Decisions?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Tõnisson, René; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesolev bakalaureusetöö küsib, kas autonoomsed masinad suudavad teha eetilisi otsuseid. Autonoomse masina all mõeldakse siin selliseid masinad, mis on võimelised tegutsema ilma pideva inimese poolse juhtimiseta ning mida kontrollib tehisintellekt. Autor arutleb eeliste ja puuduste üle, mis on erinevatel eetilistel printsiipidel, mida masin saaks kasutada alusena oma otsuste tegemisel. Siia on kaasatud nii klassikalised eetikateooriad nagu näiteks utilitarism kui ka alternatiivsed lähenemised nagu juhtumipõhine masinõpe. Samuti leitakse, et valdkonnapõhise eetika masinasse juurutamine oleks kergem, kui püüd korraga arendada üldisel eetikal põhinevat masinat. Vaadeldakse ka üldist masinapoolse otsustusprotsessi olemust ning jõutakse järeldusele, et kuna masinal puudub teadvus, vaba tahe, kavatsuslikkus ja omakasupüüdlikkus, siis ei ole masinad võimelised tegema eetilisi otsuseid sel moel nagu inimene. Sellest hoolimata on masinad võimelised tegema otsuseid, mida saab pidada eetiliseks mingis kindlas situatsioonis, juhul kui neisse on implementeeritud sobiv eetiline printsiip ning masin suudab koguda adekvaatset infot end ümbritseva kohta.
Can Computers be Creative?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Keenan, Patrick; Kitsik, Eve, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
It is sometimes claimed that computer automation of work will free people up to be more creative and that being creative is a way to add value to one’s life. However, if computers themselves become creative, then this might impede a human’s ability to add value to their life. This thesis investigates the question ‘Can computers be creative?’ by assessing the role that consciousness plays in creativity. Specifically, I assess the following argument against computer creativity: (1) creativity requires consciousness; (2) computers cannot be conscious; (3) therefore, computers cannot be creative. The first premise is challenged by cases where humans program computers to produce apparently creative (novel and valuable) results. However, in the relevant sense of “creativity”, creativity must result from the actions of an agent. Accordingly, I will focus on whether the agency that is required for creativity requires consciousness. I draw on literature from philosophy of creativity, philosophy of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind to argue that consciousness is not necessary for creativity. I also present some considerations against the second premise, that computers cannot be conscious.
Can contempt serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against the damage wrought by superbia? A critical analysis of Macalester Bell's account of contempt
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Meriste, Heidy; Sutrop, Margit, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis is focused on whether contempt could serve as a morally appropriate form of self-defense against superbia. My analysis is largely built on and developed in critical dialogue with a thesis put forward by Macalester Bell in her monograph “Hard feelings: the moral psychology of contempt” (2013). Bell is one of the few modern moral philosophers who have defended contempt as an emotion that has an important role to play in our moral lives. Even though contempt has often been rejected as a nasty and immoral emotion and it is not particularly difficult to come up with cases where contempt would indeed be unjustified, I find it hard to deny that there is a grain of truth in saying that the virtuous agent will love the good and hate the evil1. If we are to be consistent and wholeheartedly value morality, and we agree that emotions are important mediums through which we value things (as it is assumed by the current mainstream theories of emotion), then there seems to be a prima facie case for at least some hard feelings―understood as emotions that help us hold other people accountable for their wrongdoing, or, in case of superbia (which is more to do with character rather than some isolated acts of wrongdoing), their “badbeing” (Bell 2013: 39).
The charientic: a neglected normative category
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Bailie, Natasha Jade; Francesco Orsi, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
It is a standard problem of value theory, broadly construed, to identify, classify, and analyse evaluative judgements. In 1958, Peter Glassen argued that judgements regarding vulgarity or elegance, which he calls “charientic” judgements, are (i) properly evaluative judgements; and (ii) distinct from other types of universally recognised evaluative judgements, such as moral or aesthetic ones. The goals of the current work are firstly to defend and develop these claims to establish the charientic as a proper normative category, and secondly to show, using Christine Korsgaard’s theory of normativity from her 1996 book The Sources of Normativity, that there exist charientic obligations. Grounding obligations in practical identity, a conception of oneself under which one finds oneself valuable, is key to establishing the existence of charientic obligations.

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