Filosoofia osakond

Selle valdkonna püsiv URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/10062/35471

Sirvi

Nüüd näidatakse 1 - 20 224

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A classical degree-theoretic treatment of the sorites paradox : master's thesis in philosophy
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Yau, Ching Hei; Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, juhendaja; Frances, Bryan Reed Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Since 1970s, degree-of-truth theory has been proposed as a solution to the Sorites paradox. However, one perennial attack to degree-of-truth theory is that its logic - fuzzy logic - is non-classical. Inspired by Gödel (1933), I attempt to better degree-of-truth theory by classicalizing it. That is, I attempt to give an interpretation of fuzzy logic within classical logic enriched by degree operators {⚪, ◔, ◑, ◕, ⚫} - “it is of no/low/moderate/high/full degree that …”. Intuitively, degree-of-truth is classicalized as classical bivalent truth-value and a largely independent notion of degrees. A formal semantics of this enriched classical logic is presented, from which two semantic consequences are derived. The two semantic consequences are applied to analyse the (in)validity of the Sorites argument. There are two results: 1. the validity of the standard Sorites argument is reasserted, 2. a new argument for the invalidity of the degreed version of the Sorites argument is presented.
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A comparative approach to tax exemption: differences between hospitals and religious institutions
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Wehbe, Wael; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
I study the position of religious institutions in matters of exemptions from paying taxes, the position is that religious institutions must be exempted from paying taxes in much of the same manner to hospitals since they are sufficiently similar with regard to taxation and legal status. I consider what might be required for this “sufficient similarity” to merit this equal legal status and resulting equal treatment by the state. I provide some justification of the tax exemptions hospitals receive and relate them to the three requirements for sufficient similarity. I then present three arguments against the three conditions of sufficient similarity. Lastly, I consider some objections to the conditions of sufficient similarity and the paper as a whole, I then provide some replies to these objections as best I can.
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A critical analysis of "born this way" and "not a choice" arguments for the acceptance of queer sexualities
(Tartu Ülikool, 2020) Kaling, Anna; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Building on the criticism of the good track record argument, I presented an alternative argument for the acceptance of queer sexualities based on the personal freedom to engage in consensual non-heterosexual behaviour, that is not susceptible to the status versus conduct distinction. While the behaviour-based argument I presented does not rely on both philosophically and scientifically contested concept of sexual orientation and thus has several advantages in regard to it (such as greater potential for generalizability), I did not question the usefulness of the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity in this thesis. I also did not consider the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. An interesting analysis of these issues could be provided, for example on the basis of William S. Wilkerson’s fusion theory (Ambiguity and Sexuality, 2007) and his argument regarding the role of interpretation in determining sexual orientation (Wilkinson, 2009).
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A defence of the existence of emotions in birds
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) York, Kyle; Puusepp, Vivian, juhendaja; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis demonstrates that (at least some) birds can feel emotions. First, it gives a methodological justification for how one can make such attributions in the first place. Then supplies behavioral and physiological evidence for emotions such as fear, anger, and affection. It goes on to defend the idea that birds have the neurological and cognitive capacities for emotions. It next turns towards cognitive and mental considerations, including intentionality, mental content, language-like thought, and making attributions of propositional attitudes and evaluative judgments to birds. It concludes by considering whether birds have human-like emotions or bird-relative ‘schmemotions’.
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A moral ideal for international law: Vattel on state and territory
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Otsing, Henri; Piirimäe, Pärtel, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In historia juris gentium contentiones convenire inter principia nationis libertatis et prosperitatis gentium iam diu notissimarum quaestionum fuit. Haec tractatio contradictionem in Ius Gentium de Vattelio (MDCCLVIII) promptam investigat, et censet Vattelium duo principia per notionem civitatis moralem convenire. Haec tractatio utpote enim putat notionem civitatum qua “personarum moralium” – ex proportione nationum et individuorum seu aequalitate adduxit – enodere aliquas causas in Vatteliano. Causae sunt hae divisa in partes tres. Prima, imperium proprium – accusationes colonialismi efficiens – etiam qua elementum societatis moralis gentium intellegi possit. Alia, recusationem Vattelii civitatis maximae fortasse significationem libertatis moralis nationis interpretatum possit, non defensionem civitatum minimarum. Et tertia, territorium civitatis per se ex corpore populi adductum est, sed adfert nullum latiorem nationalismum.
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A non-moral critique of the norm of assumed objectivity
(Tartu Ülikool, 2020-08) Närvänen, Emmi; Davies, Alex, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Sally Haslanger (2013) has described a particular norm of objectivity, the norm of Assumed Objectivity, that she considers as morally problematic. This norm, when correctly applied, permits one to form essentialising beliefs about women. According Haslanger, under the conditions of gender inequality, adopting hurts the interest of women while serving the interests of men. Rae Langton (1993), in contrast, has argued that a moral critique of the norm has its shortcomings: if a particular norm is bad for some and good for others, then the grounds for rejecting the norm are weak. Thus, Langton has provided a non-moral critique of the norm that pertains to the rationality of the norm. She argues that the norm should be rejected because it fails to yield knowledge. Evangelia Papadaki (2008) has pointed to an inconsistency in Langton’s argument thereby concluding that the norm evades Langton’s non-moral critique. In this thesis, I will set out to argue the norm is vulnerable to a non-moral critique. I will argue that the beliefs arrived at fail to constitute knowledge, which gives us a rational justification to reject the norm of Assumed Objectivity
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A philosophical approach to CETI: developing a conceptual framework based on Umwelt theory
(Tartu Ülikool, 2025) Pasha, Chingiz; Mölder, Bruno, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
This thesis critiques the assumptions underlying the argument of Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence (CETI) research, which presumes that extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) would possess human-like features and technologies, and that communication with ETI would rely on the information-transmission model. These premises are refuted by exposing their reliance on anthropocentric and vague definitions of "intelligence" and "communication." Afterward, a conceptual framework based on Umwelt theory is proposed to address these issues, emphasizing the diversity of subjective worlds (Umwelten) of organisms, the concept of "commonage" as shared aspects of these subjective worlds, and communication as the exchange of signs based on the commonage among organisms. Lastly, intelligence is redefined as a relational feature of shared Umwelten emerging from communication. The thesis argues for dividing CETI into two distinct research areas with a more explicit scope for each: the search for extraterrestrial organisms (SEO) and the discovery of terrestrial types of intelligence (DTI). Broader implications within philosophy, semiotics, and interdisciplinary research are also explored, emphasizing the necessity of avoiding the widespread anthropocentric approach in studying intelligence and communication.
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A response to the practicality issue in the abolitionist animal rights framework
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Erik, Egle; Meriste, Heidy, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In this thesis I have looked into the conflict between the abolitionist animal rights approach and the welfarist approach. The welfarists focus on animals’ right to not suffer, whilst the abolitionists recognize the animals’ right to life and that the root issue of animal suffering is their exploitation, predominantly in animal agriculture. The main way to implement abolitionist ideas into the real life is through veganism – the practice of abstaining from the use of animals in food as well as other areas of life. In the second chapter I looked into the criticism towards the abolitionist approach, according to which veganism as an ethical requirement is too demanding and unrealistic. I then explained how ethical requirements such as veganism sometimes have to be demanding yet can still have practical value by providing an ideal. In the third chapter I proposed a nonideal approach, according to which we ought to eat less meat as per secondary requirements. I also introduced a scalar approach to wrongness. This theoretical framework recognizes that some acts are more wrong than others, for example eating more meat is more wrong than eating less meat, yet we can maintain the ideal that eating meat still wrongs animals.
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A taxonomy of testimonial smothering
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Mohamed, Nada Abdalla Hassan Abdelazim; Barker, Simon Reginald, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Kristie Dotson formulates testimonial smothering as a form of testimonial oppression where a speaker truncates or removes the content of her testimony leaving the testimony empty from any content for which the hearers demonstrated testimonial incompetence. On Dotson’s account of smothering, the speaker empties her testimony from all content relevant to the domain of exchange. However, Dotson’s account does not include or cover instances where a speaker smothers her testimony, yet her smothered testimony contains some content relevant to the domain of exchange. In this thesis, I present a more detailed analysis of testimonial smothering to showcase different ways in which oppressed speakers interact in exchanges in which they are oppressed. I take Dotson’s notion of smothering to be one form of testimonial smothering, which I call smothering via emptying. I introduce two other types of smothering, smothering via altering and smothering via echoing, to encompass cases where a speaker’s smothered testimony is not empty from content relevant to the domain of exchange. Then I use the taxonomy of testimonial smothering to showcase ways in which oppressed speakers can contribute to conversations in which they are oppressed.
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Abordidebatt - argument psühholoogilise persooni käsitluse kasuks
(Tartu Ülikool, 2015) Vitsut, Hell; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia ja semiootika instituut
Bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks on tutvustada filosoofilist aspekti abordidebatis, abordiga seostuvaid moraalseid probleeme ning võimalikke vastuseid. Põhiliseks ülesandeks on vastata küsimusele, millal on moraalselt lubatud teha aborti. Sellega seoses tuleb ka põhjendada, milline moraalne staatus on sündimata lapsel ning milline on see võrreldes täiskasvanud inimese ja emaga. Sündimata lapse moraalne staatus omistab tema suhtes ka teatud õigusi ja kohustusi, mille rikkumine peab olema piisavalt põhjendatud. Abordi moraalsus või ebamoraalsus on teema, mis tekitab sageli tugevaid emotsioone. Ühe vaate eest seisavad elupooldajad (pro-life), kes püüavad iga hinna eest sündimata laste tapmist peatada, ning teise eest valikupooldajad (pro-choice), kes näevad abordi keelamises naiste inimõiguste rikkumist. Tegu on moraalse probleemiga, mis ikka ja jälle muutub aktuaalseks nii läänes kui mujal. Maailmas leidub piirkondi, kus abort on karistatav surmanuhtlusega. Samuti on riike, kus seda nähakse enesestmõistetava inimõigusena. Kuigi tegemist võib olla levinud praktikaga, on see siiski kohati tabuteema, millest osalejad ei taha avalikult rääkida. Säärane hoiak on mõistetav, sest kuigi paljud inimesed ei pühenda aega abordi filosoofilisele mõtestamisele, on suuremale osale arusaadav, et selle käigus surmatakse keegi või miski tahtlikult. Tegu ei ole ka niisama tapmisega, vaid inimese või kellegi, kes kunagi võiks inimeseks saada, kaotamisega. Seega on tüüpiline, et isegi ühiskondades, kus aborti seaduslikult tõlgendatakse naise inimõigusena, eksisteerib paralleelselt arvamus, et seda peaks siiski varjama ning vältima. Nii nähakse raseduses midagi iseenesest väärtuslikku ja kohati püha, mis peaks olema rõõmustav, mitte kurvastav. Töös püüan just seda tundlikku teemat mõlemast vaatekohast esitada ning näidata, kuidas elu- ja valikupooldajad võivad näha sama moraalset probleemi kardinaalselt erinevalt.
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship
(Tartu Ülikool, 2019) Ametefio, Saviour De-Graft; Davies, Alex Stewart, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In conclusion, I have argued that epistemic partiality undermines friendship if we accept that friendship in a stricter sense is based on character. The argument I have present give two justification for that. The first is that when we allow an excellent friend to behave doxastically biased in favor of his friend consistently, this will promote more vices. Epistemic bias seems to be a bad epistemic practice. This is because knowingly leading away from the evidence and correct judgment of your friend's conduct is unjust. Cultivating such behavior in friendship will only corrupt the friendship. The second is that the fact that you esteem your friend’s character by deceptive means does not change the reality that the person has flaws in his character. When in our assessment of information about our friends, intentionally favor that which seek to portray him more favorably in a good light, we act deceptively. When we notice this shortcoming, we must correct it. The instrumental argument aims to encourage friends to help each other in their development as a person. Therefore, recognizing their flaws may be one of the ways to help them grow. In fact, in friendship relations that works well the idealization of your friend and the friendship itself helps in the longevity and flourishing of that relationship. However, if the bias becomes excessive and unwarranted, for example, if negative feedback is not considered at all or the positive attitudes towards your friend become unrealistically optimistic, then the bias may become dysfunctional.
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Against the guise of the good
(Tartu Ülikool, 2022) Dua-Ansah, Bright; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The Guise of the Good thesis explains the nature of intentional action as aimed at accomplishing something that appears good to the agent. According to the Guise of the Good theorist, without the belief that doing such and such leads to preferred results that the agent thinks are good, they would otherwise not act, or they will choose to act differently. This makes sense as an explanation of why people do what they do since we are unlikely to act upon attractions we see no good in �� if we are doing so out of our deliberation. The Guise of the Good thesis is distinct in that it distinguishes the practical actions of humans from mere impulses and automated responses. The evaluative content attached to practical actions under the Guise of the Good commits the thesis to being a necessary explanation of intentional action. In a way, the Guise of the Good thesis has become the standard account of action theory. I argue that it is not the case that whenever we act intentionally, we are acting under the Guise of the Good. The thesis cedes too much power to the agent in justifying the goodness of their action.
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Against the narrative self
(Tartu Ülikool, 2018) Rehman, Ayesha; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Vivian Puusepp, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
In my thesis, I argue against the narrative conception of self, the idea that our self is narrative in structure and that we live life as a narrative. First, I differentiate between the strong and weak narrative view of self. I classify Dennett and Bruner’s account as the strong claim, Schechtman and Cavarero’s as the weak narrative claim. Second, I reject both the descriptive and normative narrativity thesis. I question the universality of a Narrative outlook. I argue that the artificial constructing of a narrative self is not conducive to self-understanding and that our choices of structuring it might be limiting. Last, I defend the non-Narrative conception of self against the common objection that without a selfnarrative one cannot be held accountable. I discuss Eichmann’s defense in Jerusalem along the way to untangle the link between narrativity and accountability.
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Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalne mõju väärtussüsteemidele
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Raud, Joosep; Volberg, Mats, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesoleva töö eesmärk oli vaadelda Aju-arvuti koosluse potentsiaalset mõju väärtussüsteemidele. Antud eesmärgi täitmiseks sai kaardistatud küsimuseks vajalikud temaatilised aspektid. Kõigepealt sai kaardistatud aju-arvuti tehnoloogia olemus ning selle potentsiaal kommunikatsioonivõimekust efektiivsemaks muuta. Vaadeldud sai väärtussüsteeme, eesmärgiga kaardistada hulk parameetreid mille kaudu oleks võimalik tööle keskset küsimust mõtestada. Antud parameetritest kõige kesksemal positsioonil seoses töö põhiteemaga oli väärtussüsteemide dünaamika. Antud peatüki juures sai kaardistatud dünaamika ehk kommunikatsiooni olemus väärtussüsteemide ning inimeste vahel. Järgnevalt sai vaadeldud kuidas dünaamika osas välja toodud aspektid muutuvad, kui nende juures eeldada aju-arvuti kooslusest tulenevat kommunikatsioonieelist.
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Alienation and resignation: why don't we act against apocalyptic futures?
(Tartu Ülikool, 2021) Gavrilin, Andrey; Kattago, Siobhan, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Humanity faces apocalyptic futures which are the product of the current socio-economic system. However, the present response is insufficient. This thesis analyzes what prevents people from effectively acting against future catastrophes. In order to do so, I use climate change as the main example and employ a Marxist critique of capitalism. I argue that the insufficiency of current responses to catastrophic futures can be explained by Marx’s notion of alienation which is inherent to the current mode of production. In first three chapters I demonstrate different consequences of estranged labor. First, it makes people alienated not only from the fruits of their labor, but also from other people, thus preventing collective actions. Secondly, it disconnects individuals from the world which they collectively produce. Thirdly, it alienates individuals from a collectively produced future, affecting their perception of temporality and making them see the future as inevitable but eternally postponed. Thus, they become discouraged to act against the catastrophes which they collectively cause. In the fourth chapter I propose two philosophical solutions to this deadlock – Stoicism, which enables individual activity, and existentialism, which motivates people to act even if their struggle is absurd.
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An assessment of Katharine Gelber's speaking back argument in the context of ethnic russians living in Estonia
(Tartu Ülikool, 2023) Stamberg, Renee; alexander Stewart Davies, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
The thesis focused on assessing whether the speaking back policy presented by Katharine Gelber would work in a context like Estonia. I started by introducing hate speech, which is a growing problem in today's society. Hate speech causes harm to victims, which in turn diminishes the target’s speech capabilities and takes away their feeling of inclusion in society. I found that there are two ways to combat hate speech, one is speech restricting laws and the other is using alternative approaches such as the speaking back approach.
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Animal research and objectivity
(Tartu Ülikool, 2017) Neemre, Eveli; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Oma magistritöös huvitusin ma loomauuringute objektiivsusest. Loomade uurimisega seondub interaktsioonist tulenev subjektiivne element, mis on vastuolus tavapärase arusaamaga objektiivsusest. Selle vastolu tõttu peetakse mõningaid loomauuringuid ebaobjektiivseks või suisa pseudoteaduslikuks. Esimeseks sammuks selle probleemi uurimisel selgitasin objektiivsuse mõistet. Selle käigus leidsin, et tavapärane arusaam objektiivsusest ja sellega kattuv arusaam absoluutsest objektiivsusest teaduses ei sobi tegelikult teadustöö loomusega. Nõustun Helen E. Longinoga, et teadus ja teadusloome on oma olemuselt sotsiaalsed ja seetõttu peaks ka objektiivsust mõistma sotsiaalselt, mitte individuaalselt nagu klassikalises arusaamas objektiivsusest. Minu teiseks sammuks oli uurida konkreetseid loomauuringute näiteid sotsiaalse objektiivsuse valguses, et näha kas loomauuringud saavad olla objektiivsed samadel alustel kui teised teadused. Keskendusin kahele suurele uurimissuunale loomauuringutes: loomade keeleprojektidele ja mõttelugemise eksperimentidele. Esimene neist, loomade keeleprojektid, ei olnud väga objektiivsed, kuna selle ala juhtivate projektide teadlased ei olnud võimelised kriitikale adekvaatselt reageerima ning seetõttu oli nende projektide objektiivsus kompromiteeritud. Mõttelugemise eksperimendid seevastu osutusid objektiivseteks, kuna uuringute algusest peale olid teadlased avatud kriitikale ja alternatiivsetele hüpoteesidele ning kriitikute ja teadlaste vahel toimus elav diskusioon, mis pani aluse uutele eksperimentidele ja uurimissuundadele. Järeldasin, et loomade uuringud võivad olla hoolimata neis sisalduvast subjektiivsest elemendist objektiivsed, kui loomadega tegelevad teadlased osalevad avatud kriitilises diskusioonis.
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Antropotsentrismi õigustamine keskkonnaeetikas Bryan G. Nortoni nõrga antropotsentrismi näitel
(Tartu Ülikool, 2016) Kruusmäe, Juta; Keerus, Külli; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Käesolevas bakalaureusetöös käsitletakse keskkonnalaste kohustuste põhjendamist antropotsentriliselt ehk inimkeskselt. Töös keskendutakse ennekõike Bryan G. Nortoni artiklile ”Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism” (1984), kus esimest korda eristatakse tugevat antropotsentrismi nõrgast. Viimasega saab õigustada looduskaitset. Töö eesmärgiks on selgitada, kas Nortoni nõrga antropotsentrismi järgi teostatav looduskaitse on eetilisest vaatevinklist piisav. Looduse kaitsmise vajaduse põhjendamine on keskkonnaeetika üks keskseid ülesandeid, sest see eetika suund arutleb, millised kohutused on inimestel keskkonna ees. Tugeva antropotsentrismi järgi on inimeste kõik soovid ja vajadused samaväärsed, nii ei ole võimalik neid kritiseerida. Nortoni nõrk antropotsentrism esindab inimeste mitmekesisemaid väärtusi, kuhu kuulvad ka need, mis kritiseerivad loodust ekspluateerivaid väärtussüsteeme. Käesoleva töö põhiteesiks on, et nõrk antropotsentrism on piisav loodukaitse põhjendamiseks ehk muudetud antropotsentrism on õigustatud keskkonneetikas.
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Are Reasons for Action Agent’s Psychological States or Facts of the World
(Tartu Ülikool, 2013) Reiljan, Merike; Orsi, Francesco, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofiateaduskond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
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Argumendid looduskeskkonna kaitseks Albert Schweitzeri essee “Aukartus elu ees” käsitluses
(Tartu Ülikool, 2024) Viik, Kerttu-Kaisa; Simm, Kadri, juhendaja; Tartu Ülikool. Humanitaarteaduste ja kunstide valdkond; Tartu Ülikool. Filosoofia osakond
Loodushoiu teemad on tänapäeval taas rohkem aktualiseerunud, mis on tõeliselt oluline iga üksikisiku ning kogu ühiskonna jaoks. Keskkonnaeetikaga seonduvaid probleeme hakati algul teadvustama 1960. aastatel, kui inimeste halvad keskkonnaga seonduvad harjumused oleksid ühiskonna ökoloogilisse kriisi viinud. Sealt sai alguse mõistmine, et inimesed peavad oma keskkondlikku käitumist muutma hakkama. Keskkonnaeetika kui filosoofiline distsipliin sai alguse 1970. aastal. Traditsioonilised eetikakoolkonnad ei ole suutelised keskkonnaga seotud küsimustes adekvaatseid vastuseid andma, kuna need eetikasüsteemid seonduvad ikkagi eelkõige inimeste omavaheliste suhete ning seetõttu tekib nende läbi keskkonnaküsimustega seonduvat juureldes “sein ette”, kuna, nagu juba mainitud, on need piiratud inimesega ning seega oli tarvis, et eetika laieneks ja tekiks eraldi keskkonnaeetika distsipliin.

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